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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The model developed in this paper highlights the structure of costs and benefits on which the 
decisions of investment in human capital by firms and workers depend under the hypothesis of 
imperfect labour markets. In this case, the wage after the training period remains below 
productivity. Several options of training policy are analysed through the model and their outcomes 
compared for what concerns the level of training and other outcomes. It is confirmed that a 
training subsidy financed by a tax on wage of trained workers does not determine the desired 
effects when labour market is imperfect. On the contrary, a subsidy can be effective if it is 
financed through profit taxation. Moreover, when workers’ union and employers bargain over 
wage of trained workers, a positive effect on the total number of trainees in the economy can arise.  
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1. Introduction 
 
According to human capital theory training underinvestment can arise in case of imperfect competition 
in the labour markets and when workers are credit constrained. In both cases training policies have to be 
considered in order to increase the amount of training and to alleviate the consequences of underinvestment. 
The model developed in this paper puts in evidence the structure of costs and benefits on which the decisions 
of investment in human capital by firms and workers depend under the hypothesis of imperfect labour 
markets. Several options of training policy are analysed through the model and their outcomes compared for 
what concerns the level of training and other features like the distribution of costs and benefits and wage 
differentials between trainees and trained workforce. The second section draws a theoretical scheme of 
evaluation of training policies effectiveness in connection with the structural characteristics of the markets. The 
third section develops the model of analysis of the enterprises’ choices relative to training under the hypothesis 
of an imperfect labour market and in the presence of different policies and of collective wage bargaining. The 
last section synthesizes main results and indicates some prospects of further research. 
 
2. Market failures and training policy options 
 
 The economic analysis distinguishes two fundamental cases of malfunctions of the markets due to 
which an inefficient amount of resources is invested in training, with regards to general or, at least, not strictly 
specific training (Stevens 1999). The first case is that in which the labour market operates in a perfectly 
competitive manner, the wages are equal to labour productivity and the benefits of training stimulate workers 
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to entirely sustain the cost of their own training.  However, difficulties emerge if credit market is imperfect and 
a liquidity constraint prevents workers from paying for training. It follows that, at least a part of their 
investment cannot be achieved, nor can it be achieved by the firms under such conditions of labour markets. 
In this case, a public intervention can make it possible for such an investment to take place by replacing 
the missing credit up to a level retained to be socially optimal. The first obvious possibility consists in a public 
loan to the workers on more favourable grounds than those offered to them by the market. The same result 
can be obtained with a training subsidy financed by a tax levied on the wage of the qualified workers. As in the 
case of the loan, the subsidy would make it possible to have a larger amount of income available during the 
training period, thereby allowing the worker to sustain the cost in exchange for a reduction (within the limit of 
the tax) of the net income that he will gain after the training period. 
In the second case, instead, it is assumed that there is an imperfection in the operation of labour market 
due to which the wage after the training period remains below productivity. Therefore the benefits deriving 
from training to the workers are lower, and consequently their availability to spend on it is lesser. On the other 
hand, the firms gain a margin of profit equal to the difference between the productivity and the wage paid to 
the skilled worker. The problem, however, is that a part of this profit is captured by those firms which are able 
to employ skilled workers without having sustained the costs (see Croce 2004). In the presence of such a 
positive externality, public intervention can impose upon firms the realization of a certain amount of training. 
This way, all firms are forced to charge themselves a part of the costs and the desired quantity of qualified 
workers will inflow in the labour market. An alternative intervention consists of a training subsidy financed by 
a tax on the profit of the firms. As a consequence of this, firms are compelled to provide the socially desirable 
level of training. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, each public intervention is effective under certain 
conditions, whereas it is totally or almost totally ineffective beyond such conditions (Tab.1).  
              
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 1 –Policies of funding of continuous training 
 
 
Causes of inefficient 
training 
 
Remedies 
Imperfect credit market 
a. Public loans 
b. Subsidies financed through tax on 
skilled wage 
Imperfect labour market 
a. Regulation  
b. Subsidies financed through tax on 
profits 
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3. Private investments, training policies and bargaining in an imperfect labour market 
 
3.1. Assumptions 
  
The model presented here develops previous works by Stevens (1996, 1999), Booth and Chatterji (1998) 
and Booth, Francesconi and Zoega (1999, 2002) and it is in line with non-competitive theories of workplace 
training which predict that training investments are shared by workers and firms and the proportion of them 
sponsored by each part varies depending on several assumptions (see also Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999). 
Unlike Stevens (1996) in this model workers don’t pay a price to the firms for training they receive but, more 
realistically, accept a reduction in their wage during training period. 
The model lasts two periods (we omit time discount for sake of simplicity). The economy is composed of 
two sectors: a primary sector comprising two firms which train their employees and, after, employ them as 
skilled workers, having the ‘high’ level of productivity 2ν ; a secondary sector with a large number of firms 
competing in a perfectly competitive labour market. Labour productivity in secondary firms is fixed at the ‘low’ 
level 1ν  and no training is supplied by them. Unlike Stevens (1996), in the primary sector not only training but 
also production occurs in the first period. Newly hired workers are trained during working-time. Training is 
general (transferable) as skills are valued the same by both firms in the primary sector. At the beginning of the 
second period trained workers enter the skilled labour market and firms compete each other to attract them. 
Competition for skilled labour in the primary sector is represented as in Stevens (1996). We assume that for 
reasons as heterogeneous mobility costs or workers’ preferences, skilled workers are not perfectly sensitive to 
wage differential between the two firms (Bhaskar et al. 2002). Because of this imperfect sensitivity there is some 
stickiness in workers’ mobility, so that even if a firm pays a wage a little below the other, it is able to retain some 
workers.  
We also assume, for simplicity, constant scale of returns to (both skilled and unskilled) labour. Wage in 
the secondary sector is constant over time and equal to productivity of unskilled labour 1ν . Instead, 
productivity in the primary sector is δν −1  in the first period, where δ  (with 1νδ < ) represents the output 
loss proportional to the given quantity of working-time – assumed to be exogenous – devoted to training, while 
in the second period it is 12 νν > . Both firms face an identical training cost function ( )hNC , where jih ,=  and 
( ) 0' >hNC , ( ) 0'' >hNC , ( ) 00 =C . iN  and jN  represent the number of workers hired and trained, 
respectively,  by the firm i and j, whereas ji NNN += is their total number in the sector. 
 
  Period 1 Period 2 
Secondary sector Productivity  1ν  1ν  
 Wage  1ν  1ν  
Primary sector Productivity  1ν  - δ 2ν  
 Wage  w1i, w1j w2i, w2j  
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Workers and firms are risk-neutral. The number of unskilled workers employed in the secondary sector is 
very large at the perfectly competitive two-period income 12ν . Then at the beginning of period 1 labour supply 
(of potential trainees) in the primary sector is infinitely elastic at a two-period income 12ν . Every worker 
prefers to be employed in the primary sector if he can earn at least the same total remuneration at disposal in 
the secondary sector.  
The degree of stickiness in the workers’ mobility is measured by the function ( )ji wwF 22 −  which gives 
the probability that a trained worker chooses to be employed in firm i, when iw2  and jw2  are the wages 
announced by the firms at the beginning of period 2. This function is assumed to have the following properties 
(given 122 , ν≥ji ww ) (see Stevens 1996 and Booth, Francesconi and Zoega 2002): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ,0    where22  as  122
;022  with  0''  ;0'
;
2
1
0  ;22122
∞∈→−→−
>−≤⋅>⋅
=−−=−
xxjwiwjwiwF
jwiwFF
FiwjwFjwiwF
 
 
We also assume that neither firms nor worker know at the beginning of period 1 which preferences he 
will have in period 2. This implies that firms cannot act as a discriminating monopsonist but pay all workers the 
same wage. They only know that, given wages jwiw 2,2 , they will choose firm i with probability ( )⋅F and firm 
j with probability ( )⋅− F1 . Then, the expected wage of a trained woker is ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⋅−+⋅= FjwFiwwE 1222  and 
the participation constraint to the primary sector is ( ) 11 22 ν≥+ wEw . However, notice that, as shown in next 
sections, in the symmetric setting of this model firms choose an homogeneous wage ( 222 wjwiw == ) and 
the expected wage is reduced to 2w . 
 
3.2. Training in an imperfect labour market 
 
The model has to be solved by backward induction, so we first consider the firm’s choice of the wage of 
the second period, then we go on to training decisions made in the first period. Firm i chooses the second 
period wage in order to maximise its profits 
 
( ) ( )( )jijiii NNwwFw +−−= 22222 νπ . 
 
The first order condition is therefore 
 
 ( ) FNNFw i =− '*22ν
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from which the optimal wage for the firm, *2iw , can be derived. At this level of wage, the benefits and the costs 
of an infinitesimal wage rise are equalised at the margin. In the condition above the left-hand term measures the 
marginal benefit of a wage rise, given by the increase in the number of trained workers employed by firm i times 
the surplus ( )*22 iw−ν  that it captures on each one of them; the right-hand term, instead, measures the increase 
in the payroll costs which is proportional to the total amount of employment in the firm. The following optimal 
wage can be derived  
 
k
F
F
iw −≡−= 2'2
*
2 νν  
 
where 'FFk ≡ . The parameter k  represents the firm’s surplus and can be considered as a measure of the 
degree of monopsony power of the firm. Its value is inversely related to the workers’ sensitivity to the wage 
differential and tends to vanish for ∞→'F . It is demonstrated (see Appendix 1) that trained workers receive 
the same wage from the two firms, so that *2
*
2
*
2 wjwiw == .  
In the first period, the firm has to decide how many unskilled workers to hire and train. At this stage the 
firm takes into account the total amount of profits over both periods, given the wage to be paid in the second 
one 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )iNCjNiNjwiwFiwiNiwi −+−−+−−=+ *2*2*2211,21 νδνπ . 
 
In solving this problem the firm must respect the workers’ participation constraint given by 
2112 ww +≤ν , from which the condition kw +−≥ 211 2 νν  descends. The firm chooses the lowest wage level 
satisfying it, that is kw +−= 21*1 2 νν , with *1*1*1 ji www == . In other words, under our hypotheses – of general 
training, perfect elasticity of unskilled labour supply, risk-neutrality and absence of liquidity constraint – workers 
accept to cut their wage in the period 1 as this gives the firm the incentive to provide training and enables them 
to earn the skilled wage in the subsequent period. Besides the workers, the firms too sustain a part of training 
costs even though skills are general. This derives from the fact that they reap some returns to training in period 
2, when they expect to gain a positive surplus over skilled employment. 
From the properties given above, ( )
2
10 =F , the firm’s profits are 
( ) ( ) ( )ijiii NCNNkNk −++−−−=+ 2112,21 δννπ . 
 
The first order condition relative to the number of unskilled workers hired and trained by the firm is 
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( )*12 '21 iNCk =−−− δνν  
 
where *iN  is the optimal level for the firm i. The equivalence of wages paid by firms in both periods implies as 
well that they decide to train the same number of workers, ** ji NN = . To explain this result it must be recalled 
that the firm faces the risk of losing trained workers in the second period. Then, the expected value of the 
private marginal benefit stemming from training is just k
2
1  instead of the entire value of the monopsonistic 
rent k . The other half of this rent corresponds to the value of the externality caused by mobility of trained 
workers and it appears in the condition for the maximum profit with a negative sign. This externality depresses 
the firm’s incentive to invest in training when labour market is not perfectly competitive and lowers the number 
of trainees below the socially optimal level.  
 
3.3. Socially optimal level of training 
 
The social surplus when firms train their workforce amounts to the increase of production less direct and 
indirect training costs. In our case, where two firms with an identical cost function are considered, this can be 
written as 
 
( ) 

−−−= NCNS
2
1212 δνν . 
 
According to this function the following condition must be satisfied in order to achieve the first-best 
outcome  
 
( ) 0
2
1'12 =

−−−=∂
∂ fNC
N
S δνν   
 
where fN  indicates the number of trainees maximising social surplus. This result occurs when the market for 
skilled labour is perfectly competitive. In this case, with perfect mobility the firms pay a second period wage 
2
*
2 ν=w and make zero profits. Moreover, given the workers’ participation constraint, the first period wage is 
21
*
1 2 νν −=w . It follows that the two-period profit function is 
 
( ) ( )iii NCN −−−=+ δννπ 12,21  
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so that the firm finds profitable to train a number of workers iN  such that ( )iNC '12 =−− δνν . As this 
condition is the same as the previous one, it follows that ffii NNN 2
1== . In a perfect labour market firms 
provide exactly the socially optimal level of training (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note that 
training is provided by the firm but is paid entirely by the workers by means of the reduction of the wage in the 
training period. When the skilled wage equals productivity, workers are induced to sustain the cost of training 
up to the first-best level. 
 
 
 C’(Ni) 
 
 
                                             ν2-ν1-δ 
 
 
                                  
                             ν2-ν1-½k-δ 
                               
 
 
 
                                                                                          *iN                 
f
iN  
 
Fig. 1. Number of trainees in an imperfect labour market compared to the first-best level  
 
 
 
3.4. Training subsidy financed by a tax on profits 
 
When labour market is imperfect a policy maker aimed at augmenting training incidence could pay a 
subsidy for every trainee. The aim of this section is to verify the effectiveness of such policy when the subsidy is 
financed by a tax on the firms’ profits. In particular, we assume that in period 1 the firms are given a subsidy of 
value µ  for every trainee. On the other hand, in period 2 the firms will pay a tax proportional to the rate 
τ imposed on the profits they make by employing skilled workers. The equivalence between subsidies and tax 
revenues at an aggregate level implies ( ) NNw µτν =− 22  where, as stated above, ji NNN += . The second 
period profit of the firm i is 
 
( )( ) ( )( )jijiii NNwwFw +−−−= 22222 1 τνπ  
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and the firm’s optimal wage which results by posing equal to zero its first derivative is kw i −= 22ˆ ν . This is the 
same as that without policy. Even in this case it can be demonstrated that the firms settle an identical wage 
ji www 222 ˆˆˆ ==  (see Appendix 2). The first period wage results to be kw +−= 211 2ˆ νν . Moreover, by 
substituting 2wˆ  in the equivalence condition and simplifying, we can write µτ =k . Then the two-period profits 
are  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) iijiii NkNCNNkNk ττδννπ +−+−+−−−=+ 12112,21  
 
and the optimal number of trainees for the firm is given by  
 
( ) ( )iNCk ˆ'12112 =−−−− δτνν . 
 
As it is shown by Fig. 2, the level of Nˆ  rises when τ increases, and reaches the first-best level 
f
ii NN =ˆ in the limit case 1=τ  (the same holds true for the firm j). This demonstrates that a mechanism of 
subsidy and tax on profits can be effective in stimulating a higher level of training investment.  
 
 
 
 C’(Ni) 
 
                  
                                    ν2-ν1-δ 
 
                                   ν2-ν1-½k(1-τ)-δ 
 
                                   ν2-ν1-½k-δ   
 
 
  
                                                                                                       *iN           iNˆ  fiN  
 
Fig. 2. Increase in the number of trainees with subsidy and tax on profits  
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Intuitively, this effect can be explained by the fact that the tax is proportional to total skilled workforce 
employed by the firm in the second period, either internally trained or poached from outside, while the subsidy 
is given only for trainees hired in the first period. In other words, this mechanism transfers profits from period 
2 to period 1. From the firm’s point of view this is not neutral since expected profits are reduced by the quitting 
probability of trained workers while subsidies increase profits of the first period with certainty. 
 
3.5. Training subsidy financed by a tax on wage of the skilled workers 
 
The subsidy can also be financed through taxation on wages earned by the skilled workers. In this case, in 
the first period the firm is given the subsidy µ  for each worker hired and trained and, on the other hand, a tax 
rate ϕ  is levied on the wage of trained workers in the second period. This introduces a tax-wedge such that if 
the firm pays 2w , the take-home pay is ( )ϕ−12w . According to that, profits of firm i in period 2 are 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )jijiii NNwwFw +−−−−= ϕϕνπ 11 22222  
 
and the first order condition relative to wage is 
 
( )( ) FNNFw i =−− '122 ϕν . 
 
The firm’s optimal wage we obtain from this expression is ϕν −−= 122
kw i . As in the previous cases the 
firms pay the same wage (demonstration is analogous to those in Appendices 1 and 2). If 0>ϕ , iw2  is below 
the wage paid in the case with no policy. The reason is illustrated by the condition above. The left-hand term 
represents the net marginal benefit for the firm of an infinitesimal wage increase. Note that the reduction of the 
take-home pay caused by the tax weakens the ability of the firm to attract trained workers by means of a wage 
increase: the number of additional workers choosing the firm i as an effect of such increase amounts only to 
( ) NF '1 ϕ− . On the contrary, the right-hand term says that any wage increase causes a rise of payroll costs, 
proportional to total workforce FN . 
The take-home pay is ( ) ( ) kw −−=− ϕνϕ 11 22  and, on the basis of the participation constraint, the first 
period wage is ( ) k+−− ϕνν 12 21 . Moreover, the equivalence between subsidies and tax revenues at an 
aggregate level implies NkN ϕϕνµ 



−−= 12 . According to that, the following two-periods profits function can 
be written  
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) iijiii NkNCNNkNk ϕϕνϕδϕννπ 



−−+−+−+−−−+−=+ 112
11 221,21  
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and the first order condition relative to the number of trainees results to be 
( )iNCk '211 1112 =

 

 −−+−−− ϕϕδνν . In equilibrium the number of trainees iN  chosen by the firm is 
inversely related to the tax rate ϕ . In general, we have *ii NN <  if .0>ϕ  Taxation reduces the take-home pay, 
directly by levying the rate ϕ , and indirectly since the wage becomes a less powerful instrument to attract 
trained workers, so that the firm finds less profitable to augment the wage. Furthermore, a lower wage implies a 
weaker incentive for the worker to finance training by cutting the first period wage. At the end, a smaller 
number of unskilled workers are hired and trained by the firm. This result is in line with theoretical draft 
anticipated in section 3 and with Stevens (1999), who maintains that a subsidy financed by a tax on wages is 
unable to rise the level of training in an imperfect labour market. 
 
3.6. Training and bargaining over skilled workers’ wage  
 
So far we assumed that the wage is determined by a unilateral decision of the firm. However, it is 
worthwhile to consider the case of a bargaining with a workers’ union in order to examine how this can affect 
firm’s training decisions. For what concerns the implications of the interplay between wage bargaining and 
training investment there are not univocal results in the theoretical literature. In Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) 
firms find profitable to invest in workers’ general training when unions cause a compression of the wage 
structure. Otherwise, the same can happen if a monopolist union determines wage and training intensity at an 
industry-wide level, which is the case examined by Booth, Francesconi and Zoega (1999, 2002). In fact, contrary 
to the firm, an industry-wide union doesn’t suffer the externality caused by the probability of loosing skilled 
labour after training. Nevertheless, also a firm-level union, as Booth and Chatterji (1999) demonstrate, can 
favour a first-best training investment by the firm. This happens because the higher skilled wage resulting from 
bargaining lessens the quitting probability of trained workers and increases the expected return to training for 
the firm. However, unlike the case of wage compression, in this case training results from a wider wage 
differential between skilled and unskilled labour. Finally, various cases of interplay between bargaining and 
training decisions are considered in Hart and Moutos (1995). 
Here we assume that workers form an industry-wide union at the beginning of period 2 in order to 
contend with the firms for the distribution of the surplus 22 w−ν . Bargaining occurs at the industry-wide level 
between the workers’ union and an employers’ federation. According to that an homogeneous wage is 
established. Bargaining follows Nash scheme. Union’s objective is to maximize the earnings of the 
representative worker, whose outside option is the wage 1ν  that he can earn in the primary sector if bargaining 
fails. On the other hand, the employers’ federation intends to maximize the profits of firms in the period 2. The 
outside option for the firm in case of bargaining failure is zero profit ( 02 =π ). Let 2~w  represent the bargained 
wage, so that the union’s payoff is 12~ ν−= wW  and the firm’s payoff is ( )Nw222 ~2
1 −= νπ . This corresponds to 
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the profit function of both firms since, when an homogeneous wage ji www 222 ~~~ ==  is established at an industry 
–wide level, they stop competing each other by means of rising wage offers, and for the properties of the 
function ( ),⋅F  it is ( ) ( )
2
10~~ 22 ==− FwwF ji . The bargaining problem is 
 
ββ
w
πWBMax −= 12~
2
 
 
where β  can be interpreted as the union’s bargaining power. Then the outcome can be derived from the 
condition ( ) 0~1~~
2
2
2
22
=∂
∂−+∂
∂=∂
∂
w
W
w
W
w
B πβπβ , which gives the value ( )1212~ ννβν −+=w . As the workers 
anticipate this outcome, they accept a first-period wage ( )1211~ ννβν −−=w , which satisfies their participation 
constraint. Substitution of 1~w and 2~w in the two-periods profit function of firm i gives 
 
( )[ ] ( )( )( ) ( )ijiii NCNNN −+−−+−−=+ 1212,21 121 ννβδννβπ  
 
from which the following first order condition results 
 
( )( ) ( )iNC ~'121 12 =−+− δβνν . 
 
The same outcome is obtained for the firm j as both firms pay identical wage rates. To be advantageous 
for the workers, bargained wage 2~w  must be at least equal to the wage the firms would pay without bargaining 
*
2w . Hence bargaining occurs if union possesses enough power according to 
12
12
νν
ννβ −
−−≥ k . When this 
inequality holds in strict sense, substitution of β  in the first order condition gives *~ ii NN >  (and *~ jj NN > ). 
And in the limit case of 1=β , the outcome would be fii NN =~  (and fjj NN =~ ), the same as in the case of a 
perfectly competitive labour market. Hence, when a union bargains over the wage of skilled workers, a stronger 
incentive to train can arise for the firm. Notice that this derives as an indirect effect from the interplay of wage 
bargaining and training decisions, even if the firm continues to be the only decision-maker for what regards 
training. The explanation of this effect is that if the union gets a wage *22~ ww > , the firm looses a fraction of the 
surplus k  of the second period but, at the same time, it receives an equivalent sum through wage reduction in 
the first period. However, this is advantageous for the firm, as the expected value of one unit of the surplus in 
the second period is just 
2
1 , as this is the probability of retaining the trained worker. According to that, the 
union may help to remedy the under-provision of training arising in an imperfect labour market. This result is 
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consistent with the evidence emerging from several recent studies based on British dataset, as in Heyes and 
Stuart 1998, Böheim and Booth 2003, Booth, Francesconi and Zoega 1999 and 2003, even if further research is 
required to identify exact causality links. 
 
3.7. Wages, cost-sharing and training 
 
In every case analysed and illustrated in Tab. 2, apart from that of imperfect labour market, the number 
of trainees can reach the socially optimal level. However, in the cases C and D this should request that 
parameters assume their extreme, and unlikely, values 1=β  and 1=τ . The sum of  the first and second period 
wages is whenever the same, equal to 12ν ,  while the difference between them differs. The largest wage 
differential between trainees and trained workers arises in a perfect labour market whereas in the case with 
union and bargaining the wage profile becomes steeper as the parameter β increases. Instead, cases A and C are 
characterised by the narrowest wage differential. Furthermore, in case C a higher number of trainees than in A 
is reached whenever 0>τ  and without an enlargement of the wage differential. Steepness of wage profile over 
time is relevant if we admit that workers are risk adverse and credit constrained. 
 
Tab. 2. Synopsis of the model results under different assumptions  
 
Assumptions  
Wage of the 
period 1 
Wage of the 
period 2 
Difference 
between 
wages of 
the two 
periods 
First-order conditions relative to the 
number of trainees 
A.  
Imperfect 
labour market 
k+− 212 νν  k−2ν  ( )k−− 122 νν  ( )*'2112 iNCk =−−− δνν  
B.  
Perfect labour 
market 
212 νν −  2ν  ( )122 νν −  ( )fiNC '12 =−− δνν  
C.  
With subsidy 
and tax on 
profits 
k+− 212 νν  k−2ν  ( )k−− 122 νν  ( ) ( )iNCk ˆ'12112 =−−−− δτνν  
D.  
With industry-
wide wage 
bargaining 
( )121 ννβν −−  ( )121 ννβν −+  ( )122 ννβ −  ( )( ) ( )iNC ~'121 12 =−+− δβνν  
 
 
A major result of the model is the forecast of cost-sharing between worker and firm. The former finances 
training by lowering his wage of the period 1 below his reservation level of the same period, which is given by 
the wage paid in the secondary sector ( 1ν ), by an amount equal to the increase of the second period wage above 
his reservation level of this period ( 1ν ). For this reason, the total earnings of the worker over the two periods 
are whenever equal to his participation constraint 12ν , so that he doesn’t get any net benefit from training. On 
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the other hand, the firm equalises at margin benefits and costs of training and finds profitable to pay a sum 
equivalent to the increase of its profits. Under the hypothesis of a perfectly competitive labour market – in 
accordance with Becker (1962) – the worker bears the whole cost. Otherwise, when an imperfect labour market 
is considered, the worker and the firm share the costs. In period 2 the former obtains a wage k−2ν , which 
implies a gain above the reservation level  ( ) 12 νν −− k . Then he is ready to reduce the first period wage by the 
same amount. At the same time, the firm too finances training. Its investment amounts to k2
1 , that is the 
expected value of the surplus it captures on each skilled worker employed in period 2. Then, the total 
investment is given by the sum of the contributions of the two parties (minus the indirect cost δ )  and 
corresponds to the value deriving from the first order condition. 
 
4. Conclusions   
 
The results obtained from the model can be useful to attempt a theoretical evaluation of effectiveness of 
training policies. Firstly, it is confirmed that a training subsidy financed by a tax on wage of trained workers 
does not determine the desired effects. On the contrary, a subsidy can be effective if it is financed through 
profit taxation. Second, our results demonstrate that workers and firms share training investments and the 
proportion of the costs financed by each side depends on the distribution of benefits determined by structural 
features of the labour market. Third, when workers’ union and employers bargain over wage of trained workers, 
a positive effect on the total number of trainees in the economy can arise. Yet, several basic assumptions that 
can limit the validity of these propositions in some respects must be recalled, as they indicate further lines of 
research in this field. First of all, we only considered the case of labour market imperfections without paying 
attention to the possibility of credit constraints preventing workers from investing in their training. Moreover, 
also ‘training market’ imperfections caused by substantial problems of asymmetric information between the 
firm which provides the training and the worker who pays for it should be considered. As in large part of the 
literature, our model is a static one, in the sense that it doesn’t take into account explicitly of neither technical 
and organisational innovations nor the “culture” of the players (employers, workers, and their respective 
associations).  To finish, the model concentrates on incentive structure underlying training investment decisions 
and on its sensitivity to alternative policies, without considering a set of further institutional factors – as 
arrangements of working and training-time, workforce classification inside the firms, and certification – which 
play a major role in training systems. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Following Stevens (1996), profit equations of the two firms in period 2 are 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]( )jijijj jijiii NNwwFw
NNwwFw
+−−−=
+−−=
22222
22222
1νπ
νπ
 
Then first-order conditions are  
( )( ) FNNFw FNNFw ji −=−
=−
1'
'
*
22
*
22
ν
ν
 
The solution of these gives the optimal wages 
'2
*
2 F
Fw i −=ν  and '
1
2
*
2 F
Fw j
−−=ν . If we define 
ji wwx 22 −= , it results '
21
22 F
Fww ji
−=− . Given the properties of ( )⋅F , for which ( ) 210 =F , this equation is 
valid only if 0=x . 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
In this case it is possible to proceed as in the Appendix 1. The profit equations in period 2 are: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]( )jijijj jijiii NNwwFw
NNwwFw
+−−−−=
+−−−=
22222
22222
11
1
τνπ
τνπ
 
and the first-order conditions 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )NFNFw
FNNFw
j
i
−−=−−
−=−−
11'1ˆ
1'1ˆ
22
22
ττν
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The optimal wages which solve these conditions are the same as those obtained in the case without 
taxation, then it follows that 0ˆˆ 22 =−= ji wwx as demonstrated above in Appendix 1.  
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